(1) As used in this section, "unlawful sexual offense" means enticement of a child, as described in section 18-3-305, sexual assault, as described in section 18-3-402, when the victim at the time of the commission of the act is a child less than 15 years of age, sexual assault in the first degree, as described in section 18-3-402, as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, when the victim at the time of the commission of the act is a child less than 15 years of age; sexual assault in the second degree, as described in section 18-3-403(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(g), or (1)(h), as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, when the victim at the time of the commission of the act is a child less than 15 years of age, or as described in section 18-3-403(1)(e), as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, when the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim; unlawful sexual contact, as described in section 18-3-404(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(f), or (1)(g), when the victim at the time of the commission of the act is a child less than 15 years of age; sexual assault in the third degree, as described in section 18-3-404(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(f), or (1)(g), as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, when the victim at the time of the commission of the act is a child less than 15 years of age; sexual assault on a child, as described in section 18-3-405; sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, as described in section 18-3-405.3; aggravated incest, as described in section 18-6-302; trafficking in children, as described in section 18-6-402; sexual exploitation of a child, as described in section 18-6-403; procurement of a child for sexual exploitation, as described in section 18-6-404; indecent exposure, as described in section 18-7-302, soliciting for child prostitution, as described in section 18-7-402; pandering of a child, as described in section 18-7-403; procurement of a child, as described in section 18-7-403.5; keeping a place of child prostitution, as described in section 18-7-404; pimping of a child, as described in section 18-7-405; inducement of child prostitution, as described in section 18-7-405.5; patronizing a prostituted child, as described in section 18-7-406; or criminal attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the acts specified in this subsection (1).

Was the victim's lawyer misreading or misleading with applicable Colorado law? Whatever the answer, Judge Ruckriegle will certainly not be pleased. This is not a good way to make friends and influence judges.

No judge likes to have the public misled about his ability to understand and follow the law. Look for the Court to put this back in the face of the offending attorney if and when he gets the opportunity. Right now, it is not even clear that the victim's attorney had the standing to file any such motion.

So what is this motion really about? It comes on the heels of the rape shield hearing in which the accuser testified yesterday. Nobody but the people inside the courtroom knows how it went. But let's say that it went bad for the prosecution and the alleged victim. What would happen then?

Judge Ruckriegle would allow, at a minimum, that Team Kobe can put on evidence that Kobe Bryant was the middle man. There would be evidence of the sexual intercourse by another man two days before and evidence of sex with yet another man after Kobe Bryant but before she went to the cops. If that evidence is admissible at trial, then the prosecution and the alleged victim would be wise to start thinking of a graceful way out. Could this "hurry up" filing by the alleged victim's lawyer be an indication of a graceful exit strategy?

When you are stuck in a long line that is moving slowly, one of several things can be done. You can wait patiently. You can ask to move ahead of other people. You can tell the people controlling the line to hurry up. Or, if none of your efforts to get special precedence work, you can throw your hands up and leave.

Craig Silverman is a legal analyst for 7NEWS. He will be contributing his thoughts on the Kobe Bryant case in the months to come. He works for the downtown Denver law firm of Silverman and Olivas, P.C., which you can contact through their Web site or by calling (303) 595-0529. You can read Craig's bio here.

Previous Articles:

• March 17, 2004: Craig's Court: Fishing In The Right Spots
• March 12, 2004: Craig's Court: DA Calls Time Out -- What Is Going To Happen Now
• March 2, 2004: Craig's Court: Are Those White Flags?
• March 1, 2004: Craig's Court: Role Reversal
• February 4, 2004: Craig's Court: You Are Free To Go
• February 2, 2004: Craig's Court: I Call Them As I See Them
• January 31, 2004: Craig's Court: Tabloid Time -- The Shapiro Factor
• January 23, 2004: Craig's Court: OJ, JonBenet, DNA and Lotsa Delays
• January 13, 2004: Craig's Court: Relevant Evidence Or Character Assassination?
• January 9, 2004: Craig's Court: Kobe's Body Is Different Now
• December 29, 2003: Craig's Court: How Slow Can You Go?
• December 15, 2003: Craig's Court: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly
• December 8, 2003: Craig's Court: A Tale Of Two Shirts
• November 21, 2003: Craig's Court: The Wacko Jacko Impact On Kobe Bryant
• November 20, 2003: Craig's Court: 101 Dull Motions
• November 19, 2003: Craig's Court: Probable Cause Equals HIV Testing
• November 18, 2003: Craig's Court: The Invitee and the Intruder
• November 13, 2003: Craig's Court: Non-Destructive Stalling In Kobe Bryant's Case
• Nov. 12, 2003: Craig's Court: A Lawyer's Blog On The Bryant Case